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Casenote

In the Interest of R.E.W.: Visitation Rights of
Homosexual Parents in Georgia

In a 1996 case, In the Interest of R.E.W.,1 the Georgia Court of
Appeals addressed an issue of first impression concerning the visitation
rights of a noncustodial homosexual parent.2 The court set a tolerant
precedent when it awarded the noncustodial homosexual father
unsupervised visitation rights with his child.'
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
R.E.W.'s parents were divorced in 1988 after R.E.W.'s mother
discovered R.E.W.'s father engaging in sexual acts with another man in
the marital bed. 4 Pursuant to the divorce agreement, custody of their
three-year-old daughter was awarded to the mother, and the father was
allowed only supervised visitation in the paternal grandmother's home.'
In November 1993, the father filed a petition in superior court to modify
the final divorce decree. He sought visitation privileges that included

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

220 Ga. App. 861, 471 S.E.2d 6 (1996), cert. denied, 472 S.E.2d 295 (1996).
220 Ga. App. at 862-63, 471 S.E.2d at 8-9.
Id. at 864-65, 471 S.E.2d at 9.
Id. at 861-62. 471 S.E.2d at 8.
Id. at 861, 471 S.E.2d at 7.
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unsupervised visitation with his daughter.8 The matter was referred to
the juvenile court pursuant to section 15-11-5(c) of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.-).' The juvenile court entered an order
extending the weekend visitation period, but refused to allow unsupervised visitation." The juvenile court based the denial of the father's
request for unsupervised visitation on the finding that the father was
currently engaged in an immoral, homosexual relationship and that the
father could not be trusted to keep his sexuality from his daughter 9
The father had been engaged in a four year monogamous homosexual
relationship, and he and his partner owned a home together in which
they lived.1 The court concluded that the father was untrustworthy
because he engaged in a homosexual act while he was married.'
The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the father's application for a
discretionary appeal.' The court of appeals found that unsupervised
visitation with the noncustodial, homosexual parent was in the best
interest of the child."8 The court reversed the order of the juvenile court
and remanded with a direction that the court grant unsupervised
visitation between the homosexual father and his daughter. 4 The
Supreme Court of Georgia denied the mother's petition for a writ of
certiorari.' Justice Carley wrote a strong dissent, however, claiming
that certiorari should have been granted and that the court of appeals
erred in its resolution of the case.'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Georgia, the best interest of the child is the standard for deciding
visitation rights of a noncustodial parent. 7 Although the courts
recognize that parents have a natural right of access to their children,
the best interest of the child standard requires that the court only

6. Id.
7. I& (citing O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5(c) (1994) (providing that the juvenile court should
have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of custody and support when
the issue is transferred by proper order of the superior court)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 862, 471 S.E.2d at 8.
10. Id, 471 S.E.2d at 7-8.
11. I&, 471 S.E.2d at 8.
12. Id. at 861, 471 S.E.2d at 7.
13. Id. at 863-64, 471 S.E.2d at 9.
14. Id.
15. In re R.E.W., 267 Ga. 62, 472 S.E.2d 295 (1996).
16. In re R.E.W., 267 Ga. 62, 472 S.E.2d 295 (1996) (Carley, J., dissenting).
17. Hughes v. Browne, 217 Ga. App. 567, 569, 459 S.E.2d 170, 172 (1995).
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consider the child's welfare."8 The best interest of the child standard
trial court broad discretion in deciding parental visitation
gives the
19
rights.
With this broad discretion, Georgia courts have sought to achieve the
best interest of the child by instituting certain restrictions and
limitations on visitation.'c Restrictive visitation rights have been
instituted in Georgia when there is a concern that the noncustodial
parent may abduct the child,2 when there is evidence that a noncustodial parent may have sexually abused the child,' or when the child
voices anxiety and apprehension about visits with the noncustodial
parent.'m
The court in Hayes v. Hayes"'stated that a parent's immoral conduct
may warrant limitations on parent-child contact only if the child was
exposed to the undesirable conduct and that conduct would likely
adversely affect the child. 2' Thus, the Georgia Court of Appeals refused
to change custody of the children from the mother to the father on the
basis that the mother was living with her boyfriend.26
Although Georgia courts had dealt with some types of undesirable
conduct, until the decision in R.E.W., the Georgia courts had not
addressed visitation rights of a noncustodial, homosexual parent.
Other state courts that have addressed homosexual parents' visitation
rights have taken different approaches in assessing the relevance of a
parent's homosexuality in determining visitationY Although applica-

18. Griffin v. Griffin, 226 Ga. 781, 783-84, 177 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1970); Gunnells v.
Gunnells, 225 Ga. 188, 189, 167 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1969).
19. Jones v. Jones, 220 Ga. 753, 756, 141 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1965).
20. Griffin, 226 Ga. at 783-84, 177 S.E.2d at 698.
21. Schowe v. Amster, 236 Ga. 720, 722, 225 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1976); Chandler v.
Chandler, 261 Ga. 598, 599, 409 S.E.2d 203, 204 (1991).
22. Moore v. Moore, 217 Ga. App. 148, 149, 456 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1995) (requiring
supervised visitation when the oldest child accused the noncustodial father of sexual
molestation); Beckham v. O'Brien, 176 Ga. App. 518,336 S.E.2d 375 (1985) (ruling that the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing the father to exercise supervised visitation
rights when he had been indicted by the grand jury for molesting his daughter); Ledford
v. Bowers, 248 Ga. 804, 804-05, 286 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1982) (holding it was an abuse of
discretion to increase father's visitation rights when there was evidence that the father was
sexually attracted to his daughter).
23. Hughes, 217 Ga. App. at 569, 459 S.E.2d at 172.
24. Hayes v. Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132,404 S.E.2d 276 (1991) (concerning a modification
in custody).
25. Id. at 133, 404 S.E.2d at 277.
26. Id.
27. See generally Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 952-55 (Wyo. 1995); Pleasant v.
Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633 (111. App. Ct. 1993); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss.
1990).
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tion of the best interest of the child standard requires courts to look at
the particular facts in each case, there are generally three positions
courts have taken to decide the extent parents' homosexuality affects
their entitlement to visitation.
The most liberal courts allow limited or restricted visitation only when
there is evidence that the parent's homosexuality adversely affects the
child.2" These courts permit unrestrictive visitation, even if the parent
openly engages in a homosexual relationship in the child's presence.'
More moderate courts allow restrictions and limitations on visitation,
such as supervised visitation, if the homosexual parent refuses to shield
the child from the parent's homosexual practices."o The moderate view
finds homosexuality to be an objectionable character flaw in the parents,
but does not restrict visitation as long as homosexuality is not practiced
in the presence of the child,"
The most conservative courts assume that exposure to a homosexual
parent is not in the child's best interest, and they allow broad restric28. Pleasant,628 N.E.2d 633,640-42 (ruling that the fact that the mother had an open
lesbian relationship was not grounds on which to restrict visitation in the absence of the
parent's homosexuality harming the child); In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287,
290-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that prohibiting homosexual father from overnight
visitations with his son in the presence of another homosexual was not in the child's best
interest when there was no affirmative showing of harm or likelihood of harm to the child);
Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 985-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (ruling that homosexual
father could not be denied overnight visitation with his two sons on the basis of his
homosexuality, absent evidence that visitation would be harmful to the children).
29. See Pleasant,628 N.E.2d at 642.
30. Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 952-55 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that the limitation
of the mother's visitation with her children was reasonable when the homosexual mother
insisted upon exposing the children to her lifestyle); In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d
492, 493 (Iowa 1990) (ruling that lower court improperly restricted visitation of husband
with children to times when no unrelated adult was present because there was no reason
to doubt husband's testimony that the children would not be exposed to his private life);
North v. North, 648 A.2d 1025, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (ruling that the child's
visitation with noncustodial HIV infected homosexual parent may not be restricted when
the parent agreed not to discuss or display his sexuality to the child); see also P.L.W. v.
T.R.W., 890 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to restrict visitation when there
was no evidence that the homosexual father engaged in homosexual activities in the
presence of the child); In re Marriage of Ashling, 599 P.2d 475, 476 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)
(concluding that the mother's visitation rights could not be limited by requiring that she
not allow any lesbians to be in her home or around the children during their visits when
the mother's sexual practices were discreet); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 892-94
(S.D. 1992) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in awarding unsupervised
overnight visitation to a lesbian mother when there was evidence that the mother exhibited
sexual behavior with her female lover in front of the children).
31. See Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 952-55; In re Walsh, 451 N.W.2d at 493; North, 648 A.2d
at 1030; P.L.W. v. T.R.W., 890 S.W.2d at 69; In re Ashling, 599 P.2d at 476; Chicoine, 479
N.W.2d at 892-94.
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tions and limitations to be imposed upon the visitation rights of a
homosexual parent."2 These conservative courts employ preventative
measures and allow restrictions even where there has been no evidence
of harm to the child, and where the harm, if any, is unlikely because
there is no evidence that the child has been exposed, or may be exposed,
to the homosexual conduct of the parent.3 3 Restrictions have included
requiring visitations to occur outside the presence of a parent's lover,"
forbidding overnight visitation,' and forbidding homosexual contact in
the child's presence.3 "
III. RATIONALE OF THE COURT
In re Interest of R.E.W. raised the question of unsupervised visitation
with a noncustodial, homosexual parent.3 7 The Georgia Court of
Appeals granted the homosexual father unsupervised visitation with the
child, holding that unsupervised visitation was in the best interest of the
child.
In its application of the best interest of the child standard, the court
recognized Georgia's express policy to encourage a relationship between
a child and the noncustodial parent.3 9 The court cited their opinion of
Hayes,4 which held that a parent's immoral conduct may warrant
limitations on the contact between parent and child only if the child is
exposed to the undesirable conduct and the conduct has, or would likely

32. White v,Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990) (holding that restrictions placed
upon mother's visitation, requiring visitations to occur outside the presence of mother's
lesbian lover, was not an abuse of discretion); Miller v. Hawkins, 549 So. 2d 102, 103 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1989) (ruling that overnight visitations with lesbian mother were properly denied
in order to reduce the children's exposure to the living arrangements of their mother); Irish
v. Irish, 300 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. App. 1980) (affirming trial court's restrictions on visitation
rights by forbidding sexual contact in the children's presence and refusing to allow
overnight visitation if the lover was present in an effort to limit the children's exposure to
their mother's lesbian relationship); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d 775, 777 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by forbidding homosexual
father from visiting with the child in the presence of his boyfriends).
33. See cases cited supra note 32.
34. White, 569 So. 2d at 1181; Woodruff, 280 S.E.2d at 777.
35. Miller, 549 So. 2d at 103; Irish, 300 N.W.2d at 739.
36. Irish, 300 N.W.2d at 739.
37. In the Interest of R.E.W., 220 Ga. App. 861, 862, 471 S.E.2d 6, 8 (1996). The case
dealt with the modification of the original divorce degree. In Georgia, visitation rights of
noncustodial parents are subject to review and modification upon the motion of either
parent every two years without the necessity of showing a material change in circumstances. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-1(b), 19-9-3(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
38. Id. at 864, 471 S.E.2d at 9.
39. Id. at 862, 471 S.E.2d at 8.
40. Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132, 404 S.E.2d 276.
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have, an adverse effect on the child. 41 In both Hayes and R.E.W. there
was no evidence that either party committed sexual acts in the child's
presence. 2 The court noted that R.E.W.'s father testified that he did
not believe that his daughter's best interest would be served by
informing her of the sexual nature of his relationship with his partner
and that he would actively conceal his homosexuality from her. The
father's mother also testified that she did not know of her son's sexuality
until the initiation of the present proceeding, and she had never
observed any displays of affection between her son and his live-in
lover."
The court then looked to other jurisdictions that had addressed
visitation rights of homosexual parents and agreed to follow the
jurisdictions that looked to whether the conduct of the parent would
The court held that "[v]isitation rights
somehow harm the child.'
must be determined with reference to the needs of the child rather than
the sexual preferences of the parent. The best interests of the child
remain paramount.""
Influenced by their own decision in Hayes and persuaded by the
analysis used in other jurisdictions, the court found that unsupervised
visitation with the homosexual parent would be in the best interest of
the child.' 7 The court was also concerned that supervised visitation
would raise suspicions in the mind of the child and that the child may
begin to question the restricted nature of her visits with her father."
R.E.W.'s mother filed a writ of certiorari, which was denied by the
Georgia Supreme Court.'9 Justices Hunstein, Carley, and Hines
dissented in the denial of the certiorari, with Justice Carley writing a
fierce dissent to the denial.5'
Justice Carley first argued that certiorari should have been granted
because the case was one of first impression and involved important
public concerns.5 1 In addition, the dissent stated that the court of
appeals erred in reversing the trial court's denial of the father's

41. In the Interest of R.E.W., 220 Ga. App. at 862, 471 S.E.2d at 9 (citing Hayes v.
Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132, 404 S.E.2d 276 (1991)).
42. Id. at 862-63, 471 S.E.2d at 8-9.
43. Id at 862, 471 S.E.2d 2d at 8-9.
44. Id
45. 1d at 863, 471 S.E.2d at 9.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 864, 471 S.E.2d at 9.
48. Id.
49. In re R.E.W., 267 Ga. 62, 472 S.E.2d 295 (1996).
50. Id. at 62, 472 S.E.2d at 295.
51. Id.
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modification petition because the reversal usurped the trial court's
authority to determine credibility and to exercise its discretion when
determining parental visitation rights."
Moreover, the dissent reasoned that the Georgia Court of Appeals
decision should be reversed because it adopted the minority rule and
that only the majority rule was compatible with "this state's jurispruThe dissent claimed that the majority of courts hold that
dence."
restrictive visitation rights are appropriate when the parent is homosexual and also currently engages in a homosexual relationship." The
dissent further asserted that the majority rule was compatible with
Georgia
criminal law which reflects a public policy against homosexuali6
ty.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The holding in R.E.W. may indicate that the courts in Georgia are
taking a more permissive view regarding homosexuality. This view
would seem to directly contradict well established and newly invoked
Georgia statutory law. As Justice Carley recognized in his dissenting
opinion, Georgia's sodomy statute" has been upheld as constitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick." In that
case, the Court stated that homosexuals do not have a fundamental right
to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." More recently, the legislature
adopted O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1 which prohibits marriages between persons
of the same sex. The statute reads in part, "[iut is declared to be the

52. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 296.
53. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 295.
54. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 296 (citing Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Visitation Rights of
Homosexual or Lesbian Parent,36 A.L.R. 4th 997 (1985); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d
1181, 1185 (Miss. 1990) (Under the "majority rule," a requirement that visitation be
conducted outside the presence of the parent's homosexual partner "is reasonable exercise
of the court's power and discretion.")).
55. 267 Ga. at 62, 472 S.E.2d at 296. The dissent argued that the court of appeals, in
deciding visitation, should not have ignored the fact that the homosexual father was
engaging in a criminal act under the sodomy law of Georgia. The dissent reasoned that
the criminalization of sodomy in Georgia indicated that the father's current homosexual
relationship may be harmful to the child. 'The father's acknowledgment that he currently
is engaged in a homosexual relationship which the citizens of this state, through their
elective legislative representatives, have criminalized 'certainly augurs for potential harm
to the child that the trial court was perfectly competent to asses.'" Id. (quoting J.L.P.(H.)
v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
56. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2 (1994).
57. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
58. Id. at 192.
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public policy of this state to recognize the union of only men and
women."59
In addition, a few days after the court of appeals opinion in R.E.W.,
and a few months before the supreme court denied certiorari in R.E.W.,
the Georgia Supreme Court declined an opportunity to revoke the state's
sodomy laws' in Christensen v. State."' Ruling five to two, the court
held that the prohibition of sodomy is a legitimate and valid exercise of
state power in furtherance of the moral welfare of the public." Clearly,
the public policy against homosexuality has been promulgated and
protected by both Georgia statutory and case law.
The court of appeals in R.E.W seemed to balance the public policy
promoting the development of the parent-child relationship against the
public policy opposing homosexuality. In an attempt to promote both
conflicting interests, the court granted the homosexual father unrestricted visitation on the condition that he conceal his sexuality from his
daughter.' The court's decision relied on the father's promise not to
divulge his sexuality to his daughter because the father believed that
concealing his sexuality would be in his daughter's best interest.6 The
court, therefore, sent a message of tolerance of homosexuality on the
condition that the parent's homosexuality be concealed from the children.
Although the court in R.E.W cited to the holdings of liberal courts,'
the court actually followed the more moderate line of cases which have
found homosexuality to be an objectionable character flaw, but did not
restrict visitation so long as homosexuality was not practiced in the
child's presence." In effect, the courts in these moderate cases,67
including R.E.W., reasoned that there is no harm if the child is unaware
of the parent's sexuality.
Justice Carley argued that this is the
minority view and should not be followed. 9 However, recent cases

59. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1 (1996).
60. Id. §§ 16-6-2, 16-6-15 (1994).

61. 266 Ga. 474, 475-77, 468 S.E.2d 188, 189-90 (1996).
62. Id. at 476, 468 S.E.2d at 190.
63. In the Interest of R.E.W., 220 Ga. App. 861, 862-64, 471 S.E.2d 6, 7-9 (1996).
64. Id. at 863, 471 S.E.2d at 8.
65. Id. at 862-64, 471 S.E.2d at 8 (citing Pleasant,628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993),
In re Birdsall,243 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), and Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987)).
66. In re Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990); In reAshling, 599 P.2d 475,476 (Or. Ct.
App. 1979).
67. See supra notes 30 and 31.
68. In the Interest of R.E.W., 220 Ga. App. at 863-64, 471 S.E.2d at 9.
69. In re R.E.W., 267 Ga. 62, 472 S.E.2d 295, 296 (1996).
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indicate that the courts are moving in this moderate direction, and
now it is uncertain if the view Justice Carley advocates is still the
majority view within the states. As of the date of this note, no new
cases dealing with this subject matter have reached the courts. It is
questionable whether the tolerant standard set forth in R.E.W. will be
followed by the Georgia courts when determining visitation rights of a
homosexual parent.
ALLISON STRAZZELLA BRANTLEY

70. See North v. North, 648 A.2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); P.L.W. v. T.R.W., 890
S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992); Hertzler
v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).

